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Abstract: Developing technologies have now changed 
the way of thinking, working and also mobility of our 
society. Technology sector is becoming a revolution of 
industry which have developed in society. However, 
technology development is not supported by public 
policy and government regulation to anticipate such 
change. In law sector, the existing policy and 
government regulation is not functionate in harmony 
There is an inequality when technology's presence 
cannot go along due to the different point of view with 
the existing laws and regulations. 
Upon such technology development,  the technology 
transportation services have now come up. The 
presence of online transportation has caused legal 
problems to arise. One of them that will be discussed 
in this paper is Predatory Pricing practice allegedly 
conducted by applicator businessmen in the field of 
online public transportation company. The 
implementation of predatory pricing allegedly 
conducted by applicator online transportation 
company has caused businessmen in the relevant 
market closed down and has caused barrier to entry to 
the online transportation which causes unfair 
competition. In practice, Rule of Reason approach in 
this predatory pricing is difficult to prove due to the 
investigation process and deep economic analysis. The 
role of regulation in business competition is unable to 
protect small and medium enterprises in 
transportation field to keep exist and compete in 
facing this predatory pricing practice as the purpose 
of this regulation. The presence of online 
transportation has to be controlled as it might caused 
a very low price to be applied by applicator of online 
transportation which fulfilled the element of 
prohobited activites based on Law No.5 of 1999 
Article 20 concerning Predatory Pricing. In its 
impelementation, such activity cannot be proceed by 
KPPU, while unfair business competition continues to 
occured in practice. This has shown that such 
regulation is not effective to protect business 
competition, eventually online transportation 
technology is becoming a threat to the sustainability 
of conventional transportation. Therefore, the 
predatory pricing regulation in the Law of Unfair 
Business Competion in Indonesia needs to be 
reassessed and  its implementing regulation which put 
forward mitigation needs to be renewed to become a 
legal basis to KPPU to act so that it can create fair 
business competition,  legal certainty and justice by 
creating the same level playing field in the public 
transportation in Indonesia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of science and technology has 
changed the world as the first generation of industrial 
revolution that had begun since the end of the 18th 
century with the invention of the steam engine give 
rise to history when human and animal power was 
replaced by the appearance of machines.  The second-
generation of revolution was marked by the emergence 
of power plants, this invention triggered the 
emergence of telephone sets, cars, airplanes that 
changed the face of the world significantly.  
Furthermore, the third-generation of industrial 
revolution was marked by the emergence of digital 
technology and the internet that played a role in the 
development of computerization and automation.  
Nowadays, the world has entered the fourth phase of 
the industrial revolution history, this phase is often 
referred to as "Industrial Revolution 4.0".  The 4.0 
industrial revolution occurred around the 2010s 
through intelligence engineering and the internet of 
things as the backbone of human and machine 
movement and connectivity.i 
Facing the entry of the Industrial Revolution 4.0 in 
Indonesia, the online transportation business has 
become a challenge for Indonesia in terms of 
regulatory readiness in the field of business 
competitions.  Predatory Pricing is one of the activities 
prohibited in Law Number 5 of 1999 concerning 
Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair 
Business Competitions (Law No. 5 of 1999).   
Competition in the business world is a condition 
sine qua non or an absolute requirement for the 
implementation of market economy, although it is 
recognized that business competition could be fair or 
unfair.ii One form of anti-competitive business 
behavior which is a concern in Law no.  5 of 1999 is 
to sell loss or set prices very low with a view to getting 
rid of or shutting down competitors in the relevant 
market or Predatory Pricing.iii In the short run, selling 
loss or Predatory Pricing can be profitable because 
consumers enjoy low prices for goods or services.  But 
in the long run, after competitors are knocked out from 
the market, the predatory business actors will again 
raise the price of goods or services.  Thus, the practice 
of Predatory Pricing can lead to monopolistic practices 
and/or unfair business competitions.iv 
 Online-based public transport application 
companies in Indonesia currently involve at least 2 
(two) leading companies (one of which is a unicorn in 
Indonesia), namely Go-Jek and Grab, previously Uber 
was one of the online transportation applicator 
companies but in its development merged with Grab. 
 Legal issues in the field of online transportation 
business competitions in Indonesia started from the 
accusation that their presence was considered illegal, 
because it did not meet the rules of organizing public 
transportation.  The online transportation does not 
have an Indonesian legal entity, does not have a public 
transportation business permits, and there is no 
obligation to conduct a feasibility test (KIR).  As a 
result, they do not pay taxes, so online taxis are able to 
offer more easily.  This makes online taxi penetration 
within a short time able to erode the conventional taxi 
market.  The government has not yet prepared 
regulations that can reach the presence of such online-
based business models that have social and fiscal 
impacts.  
Socially there is a sharp friction between the old and 
the new business actors.  Ironically, the old business 
actors involved the poor, such as conventional taxi 
drivers.  Fiscal impact, the government loses potential 
income tax from online-based business actors, because 
there are no legal rules to protect it.v 
II. RESEARCH METHOD 
This study applies a type of juridical-empirical 
research to examine the validity and effectiveness of 
the law.  The approach used in this research is: socio-
legal approach.  This approach is undertaken with a 
sociolegal study that is the textual study of articles in 
legislation and policies to be critically analyzed and 
explained their meaning and implications for the 
person (legal subject).  Sources of data are obtained 
from several sources, namely: primary legal materials 
used consist of: UU No.  5 of 1999, UU No.  22 of 
2009, PP No.  74 of 2014, PM No.  118 of 2018, KPPU 
Regulation No.  6 of 2011, and the Director General of 
Land Transportation Regulation No.  
SK.3244/AJ.801/DJPD/2017  
Data collection technique used in this research is 
literature study, observation is done by using online 
applications to collect and compare the pricing data of 
each application providers (Uber, Grab, and GoJek) 
for trips with a certain distances and times compared 
to regular taxi transportations.  Interviews were also 
conducted, the interviewees are including the Chair of 
The Business Competition Supervisory Commission 
(KPPU), the Legal Division of the KPPU, academics 
and experts in the field of business competitions, DPP 
Organda 
 
 
 
III. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Related to the results of the study, the researcher 
corroborates that opinion.  The implementation of the 
online application-based transportation, the 
researchers considered unfair business competition.  
Researchers identified the occurrence of Predatory 
Pricing in Online Transportation in Indonesia.  Based 
on the elements contained in Article 20 of Law No.  5 
of 1999 identification of alleged predatory pricing can 
be aimed at proving the occurrence of "very low 
prices" and "intending to get rid of or kill the 
competitors".vi  This proof requires an economic 
analysis of prices (price and cost rule) to determine the 
calculation of very low prices or below the market 
price (below market price) by comparing prices in the 
relevant market.This action must also result discharge 
or death of competitors and or prevent new business 
actors in the relevant market to enter the market and 
compete fairly. 
The next identification is to see whether after the 
competitors leave the relevant market, the business 
actor suspected of undertaking predatory pricing is 
able to recoupment or recover his loss by increasing 
the monopoly price so that theyget greater profits from 
the losses they suffered when undertaking predatory 
pricing to other business actors re-enter the market. 
It should be noted that the industrial revolution 
4.0 can shift the notion of recoupment not necessarily 
by increasing monopoly prices in the same line of 
business.  Online transportation business actors in fact 
have diversification of the Internet-based business of 
Thing and Fintech which is become the source of loss 
recovery and even greater profits so that it can be a 
cross subsidy in the online transportation business 
sector that is still losing money. Article 20 of Law No.  
5 of 1999 regulates that business actors are prohibited 
from supplying goods and/or services by way of 
selling loss or setting very low prices with a view to 
getting rid of or shutting down competitors businesses 
in the relevant market so as to result in monopolistic 
practices and/or unfair business competitions. 
This clause is categorized using the Rule of 
Reason approach where the actions must be analyzed 
and evaluated in advance to see the effects that they 
have on competition by proving Based on the results 
of research conducted, researchers describe one by one 
of the elements contained in the behavior of predatory 
pricing which is allegedly undertaken by business 
actors of online transportation as stipulated in Article 
20 of Law No.  5 of 1999 as follows: 
The element Business 
Actor 
Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber 
fulfill the elements as 
business actors because 
the all three are legal 
entities that are 
established and or 
conduct business 
activities in Indonesia.  
Element Supply of 
Goods/Services 
 
The three companies 
providing online 
transportation 
applications (Go-jek, 
Grab, and Uber) also 
fulfill the element as the 
party providing supply 
of services in the form 
of online information 
technology-based 
application facilities, to 
provide public 
transportation/public 
transportation services  
The element Selling Loss the price is not fair as a 
definition of selling-
loss.  Price unfairness 
occurs if the business 
actor intentionally 
supplies goods/services 
at a price that causes the 
business actor to endure 
any loss, while the 
objective of the business 
actor to do business is to 
make a profit so that the 
business actor can 
increase the production 
of the supply of 
goods/services. 
The element With the 
intention to get rid of or 
kill the business of 
competitors 
The data present that 
within a year since the 
entry of online 
transportation and 
imposed rates far below 
the taxi transport 
regulation rates, then as 
much as 31% of the total 
number of taxi transport 
vehicles that were 
previously able to 
operate even 
experienced an increase 
from 2013 to 2014 no 
longer able to be 
operated by business 
actors. This number 
continues to decline 
until a total of 37% does 
not operate at the end of 
2016. 
The element Setting a 
very low price 
 
Go-Jek and Grab have 
the ability to be able to 
cover or subsidize 
losses in the field of 
online transportation 
despite imposing a sale 
at a very low tariff 
compared to 
competitors and or 
business actors in the 
same market in long 
period of time.   
In general, the practice of selling-loss is aimed at 5 
(five) main objectives, namely:vii 
1. Shutting down competing business actors in the 
same relevant market; 
2. Limiting competitors by applying the selling-loss 
price as an entry barrier; 
3. Getting big profits in the future; 
4. Reducing losses that have occurred in the past; or 
5. It is a promotional price as an effort to introduce 
new products as a marketing strategy tool. 
 In accordance with the objectives of the business 
actors, the behavior prohibited in Article 20 of Law 
No.  5 of 1999 is to supply goods or services by way 
of selling-loss with the intention to get rid or shut 
down competitors businesses in the relevant market so 
that it can result in monopolistic practices or unfair 
business competition.  Business actors who sell loss 
with these objectives, then at least the first three goals 
(goals number 1 to 3) will be achieved at once.  
Objectives number 4 and 5 are not prohibited in Law 
No.  5 of 1999. 
Based on observations, data, and surveys which 
have been done, researchers can state that the 
indications of selling-loss by business actors in the 
field of online transportation providers are very strong, 
so, this initial indication must be continued by 
conducting surveys and analyzes by the competent 
authority in overseeing business competition, namely 
KPPU. 
Based on the results of an interview with the 
Chairperson of the Commissioner of KPPU, Kurnia 
Toha, stated that proof of selling-loss in predatory 
pricing behavior is very difficult to do, because in a 
fairmarket it is almost impossible for business actors 
to sell loss.   
It will take a long time to get competitors in the 
relevant market out of the market or die, while this 
time the perpetrators of loss and sale continue to be in 
a state of suffering (suffering losses), but if there is a 
reality that the business actors posted negative finance 
(loss) and the tendency to continue to suffer losses, this 
is an early indication of the practice of selling-loss. 
Based on Bloomberg data, in the early days of 
online transportation spreading in Indonesia in 
2014/2015, it was stated that Uber continued to 
accumulate losses until the end of 2016 to 3 billion US 
Dollars, although revenue increased from 1.326 billion 
US Dollars at the end of the year 2015 to be 5,046 
billion US Dollars at the end of 2016.  
While Grab suffered losses during the period of 
2014 and 2015 amounting to 4 billion US Dollars as 
the data below:
 
                  -$40mn 
   
        -$40mn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Although the researcher did not get GoJek financial 
data because it is not a public company, but based on 
statements in several reports, Gojek's Founder and 
Chief Executive, Nadiem Makarim, August 20, 2018 
stated that: "We see a lot of offline appeal to online on 
all our businesses, and we almost made a profit, except 
the transportation segment, "Nadiem told Reuters, 
quoted on Monday, August 20, 2018.viii  In the world 
of ride sharing, investors who invest are not focused 
on profits, but growth.ix  In 2018, Go-Jek has a total 
Gross Transaction Value (GTV) of more than $19 
billion.  GTV is not revenue, but the total value of 
transactions processed by Go-Jek from their users 
from Go-Jek services, such as Go-Ride, Go-Food, Go-
Pay, and others.x 
Based on these data and information, a strong 
indication that the company providing online 
transportation has undertaken the practice of selling-
loss in the field of online transportation services, 
which is proven that still record losses in the field of 
online transportation services from the beginning of 
operations up to now. The researcher is of the opinion 
that with the persistence of funds from these investors, 
Go-Jek and Grab have the ability to be able to cover or 
subsidize losses in the field of online transportation 
despite imposing a sale at a very low tariff compared 
to competitors and or business actors in the same 
market in long period of time.  Therefore, the approach 
with analysis number 1 is the ability of the business 
actor to cover losses in a sufficiently long period of 
time. 
Based on the results of a survey conducted by 
researcher in November 2017 through an online 
application, a comparison of the application of prices 
between online transportation and regular taxi 
transport that services can also be ordered using the 
online application shows that: 
- Go Jek, Grab, and Uber fares on weekdays (Non-
Peak Hour) are cheaper than regular taxis by 21%, 
while during peak hours (Peak Hour) Go Jek, Grab 
and Uber rates are 11.5% more expensive; 
- Go Jek, Grab, and Uber fares on weekends and 
Sundays (Non-Peak Hour) are cheaper than regular 
taxis by 40%, while during peak hours (Peak Hour) 
Go Jek, Grab, and Uber fares are still cheaper 12%. 
Director General of Land Transportation Regulation 
No.  SK.3244/AJ.801/DJPD/2017 which is effective 
from 30 June 2017 concerning the Upper Limit and 
Special Rental Lower Limit Rates (which in this study 
are called online transportation/online taxis) in Clause 
2  determine that the amount of the Special Rental 
Transport tariff in region I, namely Sumatra, Java and 
Bali, is the upper limit tariff of Rp.6,000 / km and the 
lower limit tariff of Rp.3,500 -/km. 
 Based on the results of a survey through an online 
application in February 2018, it was found that the 
average minimum tariff under a per meter of online 
transportation was Rp.3,433/km on weekdays and 
Rp.2,958 / km on Saturdays and Sundays, this does not 
consider the promos given by Go Jek, Grab, and Uber 
so that the average tariff is 20% to 30% lower than the 
regulated regular taxi fare. 
The results of random surveys of researcher in 
March, April and August 2018 on the average 
application of online transportation rates in non-peak 
hours (Non-Peak Hour) are 14% to 60% cheaper than 
regular taxi fares, even in August 2018 until now 
(2019) still applies to pay Rp.1, - (one Rupiah) for 
users of initial payment through OVO to ride Grab.  
In addition to these facts, during rush hour and 
traffic especially rainy weather it turns out that online 
transportation applies very high tariffs up to about 
177% more expensive than regular taxi fares, and this 
also violates the tariff limits under the Dirjen 
Regulations so that the losers are user community. 
On the other hand, the application of very low prices 
by online application provider companies apparently 
also affected the welfare of the online transportation 
driver's own partners.  According to the results of a 
survey on the welfare of online transportation drivers 
conducted by INSTRAN on 300 online transportation 
driver partners, it was obtained data that one of the 
causes of the decline in income of drivers of Special 
Rent (ASK) or online transportation by 20.4% 
answered that it was caused by low tariffs per 
kilometer.  From the current rupiah per kilometer rate, 
as many as 90.7% of online transportation driver 
partners are of the opinion that the tariff is not yet 
economical, and the ideal tariff is more than Rp.3,000 
up to less than or equal to Rp.6,000 per kilometer.  
Thus, the implementation of very low prices does not 
Loss Revenue 
only affect competing business actors, but also affects 
the online transportation driver's own partners. 
 Thus, based on consideration of the results of 
surveys and analyzes conducted by researcher, then 
the element of setting a very low price is met. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Case of predatory pricing lawsuit which in essence 
is to meet the element of selling-loss, then the 
conditions must be met that: 
a. Sales price is the price below the cost of production 
b. Competitors must be able to demonstrate that they 
have the ability to recover profits or costs lost when 
selling below the price 
 The plaintiff must also be able to prove that: 
a. The selling price below the production price will be 
able to result in competitors in the form of expelling 
competitors from the market or forcing competitors 
to raise their prices 
b.  It is possible that the sell-loss scenario will one day 
result in a price above the competitive price with the 
aim of compensating for losses when selling losses 
In the era of the industrial revolution 4.0 boundaries 
and even the definition of recoupment itself does not 
have to come from businesses that are undertaken at a 
selling-loss, so also the definition of the relevant 
market also shifts.  For example, Grab and GoJek run 
their businesses not only in the field of online 
transportation. They do selling-loss by implementing 
tariffs below the relevant public transport market 
prices by implementing various promotions and 
discounted rates even today, with the aim of more 
application users.  With the continued increase in users 
of new applications, the company's value increases, 
and the company's other business products can make a 
profit.  Like GoPay and GrabPay is one of the 
diversification of their business in the field of payment 
systems based on Financial Technology (Fintech) and 
this is precisely their focus for making money, the 
wider the user, the more their payment system will be 
used, and this is seen by investors as  the rapid 
development for technology companies like them is 
therefore investors continue to pour out their funds, 
and are used to continue to do selling-loss in the field 
of online transportation, as a means to increase its 
market value.  So, according to the researcher, the 
predatory process of prices/tariffs in the field of online 
transportation itself has occurred and continued to 
occur today and this continues to have an impact on 
the public transport market, while their recoupment is 
not by making money from the same business but 
other businesses that sourced from Fintech. 
Efficiency which is the main element of the 
failure of accusations of predatory pricing by online 
application providers is actually not applicable in 
analyzing comparisons between online application 
providers and public transport companies in a relevant 
market such as regular taxi companies.  The tariff set 
by the online application provider is not the result of 
production efficiency, because the vehicle used to run 
online transportation is not an asset of the application 
provider company, but is owned by an individual or 
cooperative where all maintenance, insurance, and 
cost obligations for the vehicle are borne by the 
vehicle owner.  While the taxi company calculates the 
tariff of operating expenses with all assets and 
management is its responsibility, including insurance.  
Based on this the researcher believes that the 
application company applies prices/tariffs not based 
on the results of the production efficiency that can be 
done, but by providing price subsidies, as the data 
explained earlier, this is why the term ‘burn money’ 
occurs in online transportation businesses, and it is 
recognized that these subsidies making their services 
especially in the transportation sector segment to date 
has not yet yielded profit. 
 Based on KPPU's decision data obtained from the 
KPPU's official website, it was recorded from the time 
the KPPU was established in 2000 until the end of 
2018 that the KPPU had issued a total of 302 
decisions, and of that number none of the case 
decisions regarding predatory pricing. 
Based on information obtained from the Secretary 
General of the DPP Organda that the DPP Organda 
sent a letter to KPPU on January 24, 2017 under 
UM.208/DPP ORGANDA/EX/I/2017 regarding: 
Alleged Unhealthy Competition Practices in the Land 
Passenger Transportation Industry in Indonesia, but to 
date there have been no results from the report.  KPPU 
Commissioner Chair and Study, Policy and Advocacy 
Director, Plt.  Deputy Commission for Prevention of 
KPPU, in an interview that predatory pricing is indeed 
very difficult to prove and takes a long time because 
the approach must go through a rule of reason, 
primarily to prove the selling-loss element and the 
element with the intent as well as selling-loss, it is 
almost impossible to do  business actors because it 
must have a very large capital and survive losses 
during the predator. 
KPPU as the Commission which has the authority 
as regulated in Article 36 of Law No.  5 of 1999, has 
access to examine the financial reports of business 
actors who are reportedly suspected of having 
prohibited activities even though the company is a 
private company, this cannot be done by competitors.  
If the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, then forever 
it will be very difficult to prove predatory pricing 
because the acquisition of information and surveys 
requires huge funds and a long time, if this must be 
done by business actors who are victims of predatory 
pricing behavior, it means that the company is in a 
condition  If it has left the market or closed down its 
business, this business actor will be very heavy 
burdened.  Even if the position is finally proven, the 
benefits of the struggle for this report will no longer be 
meaningful for the reporting business actor because 
the company has also died. 
 Article 20 of Law No.  5 of 1999 has become 
ineffective in protecting fair business competition, as 
long as it does not mean that any indication that may 
originate from the existence of an incoming report to 
the KPPU is followed up with the aim of preventing 
the occurrence of Predatory Pricing rather than 
providing a requirement for the plaintiff to prove the 
existence of such action.  By looking at the side of 
prevention, each report of alleged predatory pricing 
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